Michigan Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 5

1944

TAXATION-ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED PROPERTY
LEASED TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Allen C. Holmes
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Government Contracts Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Taxation-State and
Local Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allen C. Holmes, TAXATION-ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED PROPERTY LEASED TO PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, 42 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1944).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol42/iss5/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

TAXATION-ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED PROPERTY LEASED
TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE-The Board of Property Assessment, Appeals, and
Review of Allegheny County for ad valorem taxes in the state of Pennsylvania
increased the assessed value of the realty of the Mesta Machine Company by the
sum of $6I8,ooo to include the value of certain additional machinery which
had been installed on the premises.1 The machinery was leased by the United

The tax was levied pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) tit. 72, §
"The following subjects and property shall, as hereinafter provided, be
valued and assessed, and subject to taxation for all county, city, borough, town, township, school and poor purposes at the annual rate:
"(a) All real estate to wit: Houses, lands, lots of ground and ground rents, mills
and manufactories of all kinds, furnaces, forges, bloomeries, distilleries, sugar houses,
malt houses, breweries, tan yards, fisheries, and ferries, wharves, and all other real estate
not exempt by law from taxation."
1
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States Government to the company and was placed in the factory in order that
the company might manufacture heavy field guns for the Government, under a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. The legal title and the beneficial ownership of the
machinery remained in the United States; the machinery was leased to ,the
company for the nominal consideration of one dollar under a contract which provided that the company could not use it for any other purpose than the manufacture of guns for the United States. The court of common pleas of Allegheny
County disallowed the assessment and the board appealed to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. Held,,2 the machinery became part of the realty when it was
placed in the factory 8 and could be taxed along with the land and building belonging to the company. The legal obligation to pay the tax was on the company,
not the Government; the voluntary agreement of the Government to pay the
tax, therefore, is immaterial. .11.ppeal of Mesta Machine Co., 347 Pa. 191, 32
A. (2d) 236 (1943).
The law relating to inter-governmental tax immunity, and especially that
relating to the freedom of federal instrumentalities and agencies from taxation,
has received a thorough re-examination in several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions.4 The immunity which the Court read into the Constitution 5
has been narrowed very greatly; at the same time, the Court has broadened, or
at least recognized very explicitly, the power of Congress to grant immunity to
its agencies and instrumentalities through express legislative action. 6 The basis
Reversing Appeal of Mesta Machine Co., 91 Pitts. L. J. 33 (1943).
This particular part of the holding seems to be in accord with the established
rule in Pennsylvania that when machinery is attached to the realty it is taxable as the
real estate of the owner on which the mill is located. Patterson v. Delaware Co., 70
Pa. 381 (1872). The fact that the Government had the right to remove its property
at the termination of the lease, thereby treating the property as personal property, does
not change the rule. Guthrie v. Pittsburg Dry Goods Co., 47 Pa. Super. 384 (19II).
Further, the Pennsylvania courts have held that no constitutional right is violated when
the record title holder is considered as owner for the purposes of taxation, and he may
be held personally liable for such taxes. Penn. Co. v. Bergsen, 307 Pa. 44, l 59 A. 3 2
(1932).
4 James v. Dravo Construction Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1938); Graves v. New York, 306
U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939); Pittman v. H. 0. L. C., 308 US. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15
(1939); AlabamaT. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
5 "The immunity is derived from the Constitution in the same sense and upon the
same principle that it would be if expressed in so many words." Clallam County
U.S., 263 U.S. 341 at 344, 44 S. Ct. 121 (1923); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
( 17 U. S.) 316 ( 1819); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall ( 78 U.S.) 113 ( 1870); Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1927).
6 Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U. S. l (1941) cited supra, note 4; an excellent statement of the court's position is to be found in Federal Land Bank v. Bismark
Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 at 104, 62 S. Ct. l (1941): "We have found that the
instant tax is within the scope of § 26 [granting Federal Land Banks immunity
from state imposed taxes] and that section is a valid enactment. It is not our function
to speculate whether the immunity from one type of tax, as contrasted with another,
is wise. That is a question solely for Congress, acting within its constitutional sphere,
to determine. Pittman v. H. 0. L. C., 308 U. S. 21, Smith v. Kansas City Title and
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180."
2
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of the change seems to lie' in the Court's recognition of the fact that too often the
doctrine of constitutional immunity is a shield protecting private interests, which
gives no corresponding benefit to the Federal Government.7 Further, the abandonment of the formalistic distinctions necessitated by the reference of these
problems to an unalterable rule of law-the Constitution-leaves Congress with
a flexible device whereby it can protect in o~e case and deny protection in another on the basis of sound public policy~ rather than on the basis of some analogy,
often ill-chosen, to similar questions in the past. Two tests seem to have been
evolved to limit the,application ~f this doctrine of constitutional immunity; they
are, (a) is the tax nondiscriminatory?' 8 and (b) is the tax, in law, imposed upon
the Government or the private person? 9 This approach would seem to be a realistic one, in spite of the fact that the distinction is an arbitrary one from an
economic viewpoint. The legalism employed does preserve that residuum of
federal immunity which is concomitant with the federal system; it does not
remove from state taxation significant sources of income. Before one should
attempt to employ these tests, however, in the solution of any specific question,
it might be well to notice another phase of inter-governmental tax immunity,
which has had a markedly different evolutionary development. 10 The right of
7 Typical of this point of view are: Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S. Ct.
171 (1922); Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443
(1932). Cf. James v. Dravo Con~tru~tion Co., 30~ U. S. 134 (1937) cited supra,
note 4. Complete abolition is the solution suggested by several writers: Hervey, "Judicial Delimitation of Exemptions of Federal Instrumentalities from State Taxation," 12
TEMP. L. Q. 291 (1938).
8 Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corporation, 303 U. S. 376, 58 S. Ct. 623
(1937); Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) cited supra, note 4.
9 Alabama v. King, 314 U.S. I (1941) cited supra, note 4. Discussed in 40 MICH.
L. REV. 457 (1942).
The Alabama sales tax is a privilege or license tax collected from the vendor, who
must in tunicollect it from the vendee. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 51, §§ 753, 776. The
Federal Government appearing as amicus curiae correctly concluded that this was a
"vendee tax'' and argued from this that the Government was the legal purchaser, for
King and Boozer were contractors under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract who merely
procured the materials to which the Government took title. The ·court found that the
facts showed this to be a misconstruction of the transaction and that the contractors were
the actual legal purchasers. Prior to this and other recent decisions of similar import,
the courts attempted to distinguish valid state taxation of transactions involving the
Federal Government from invalid ones through the application of these tests:
{a) Presence of burden upon the Government. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 {1895).
{b) Interference with governmental functions. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. (22
U.S.) 738 (1824).
{c) Is the tax upon the independent instrumentality one directed at the governmental source of the subject of taxation? People ex rel. Denner-Hanna Coke Corporation v. Burke, 128 Misc. 195, 217 N. Y. S. 803 (1926) affd. without opinion in 222
App. Div. 790, 226 N'. Y. S. 882 (1927) and by the court of appeals, 248 N. Y. 507,
162 N. E.· 503 (1928).
10 Hervey, "Judicial Delimitation of Exemption from State Tl!_xation," 12 TEMP.
L. Q. 291 at 296-305 (1938). The article traces the early efforts by private interests,
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a state to impose nondiscriminatory property taxes upon realty and personalty
owned by the United States was in considerable doubt during the greater part of
the nineteenth century; Congress followed the policy of imposing upon the
newly created states, as they were admitted, the obligation not to tax federal
property.11 The Supreme Court finally held that property owned by the Federal
Government was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state and wholly immune from state taxation.12 Although many questions have arisen at the periphery of federal ownership,13 no court has gone so far as to allow a direct property
tax upon property, the legal and beneficial title to which was in the United
States.14 The above arguments, which have been significant in causing the courts
to, narrow the scope of constitutional immunity, do not apply with equal force
to property owned by the United States. Exemption of such property does not
open a path of tax avoidance for individual persons or corporations who are employed by, or under contract to, the Federal Government. Further, few would
contend for direct taxation of postoffices, arsenals, or mints, for there is no serious
interference with the sources of state revenues. Is it then logically consistent or
even realistic to employ these above described tests of nondiscrimination and
legal incidence to the state taxation of personalty and realty held directly by the
United States? The conclusion would seem to be that it is not. Whether the
tax is levied upon all units of a like nature which are owned by all persons who
are within the jurisdiction of the state has no relevancy when there is no actual
particularly the railroads, which were the subjects of federal bounty, to exempt themselves from nondiscriminatory state land taxes, and shows the same narrowing of scope
of the immunity that is indicated in other forms of state taxation of federal instrumentalities and agencies.
11 No comparable legislation exists in Pennsylvania for it was one of the thirteen
original colonies. The policy of the Pennsylvania legislature is to pass specific acts
exempting real estate acquired by the Federal Government from taxation.
12 Van Bracklin v. Tennessee, II7 U. S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670 (1886). "We take it
to be a point settled beyond all contradiction or question, that a State has jurisdiction
of all persons and things within its territory which do not belong to some other jurisdiction, such as ... property belonging to or in the use of the government of the United
States." Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 at 524, 6 S. Ct. 475 (1886). Perhaps this
statement would be broad today but it does serve to illustrate the fundamental approach
of the courts to this issue. Cf. note 9.
13 Land held by government corporations formed for war purposes was unanimously
held immune from state taxation, even in the absence of express statutory exemption.
United States v. Coghlan, (D.C. Md. 1919) 261 F. 425; Clallam County v. U. S.
Spruce Production Corporation, 263 U. S. 341, 44 S. Ct. 121 (1923); King County
v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., (C.C.A. 9th, 1922) 282 F. 950;
U.S. Housing Corp. v. City of Watertown, 113 Misc, 679, 186 N. Y. S. 309 (1920).
14 The taxable character of property is to be referred to the status of the real, rather
than the nominal, owner. Private property is not ·exempt because the Government
holds the legal title thereto, and by a parity of reasoning neither is public property
taxable because the naked legal title is in a private person. King County v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., (C.C.A. 9th, 1932) 282 F. 950 cited supra, note
13. For recent state decisions reaffirming the immunity of property owned by the
United States, see Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Bryan, (Cal. App. 1943) 134 P. (2d)
15; Craig v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 192 Miss. 254, 5 So. (2d) 676 (1942).
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jurisdiction of the subject of the tax. 15 This may sound very much like syllogistic
rationalization to the state governments which see private persons and corporations enjoying the use of government property (at a rental of one dollar per
year) in the fulfillment of profitable cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts while escaping
the burden of state taxation of a large part of their productive equipment. Perhaps, however, there is a solution in the selection of the proper technique of
assessment. The usual procedure adopted in taxing property subject to a leasehold interest is to assess the entire value of the property to the owner of the
reversion. Such an amount covers the entire value of the property including both
value of the leasehold and the reversionary interest. But, where the owner is
exempt from taxation, many states tax the tenant upon the basis of his leasehold
interest.16 Such a tax upon the leasehold interest of the machine company would
offend no constitutional prohibition and would satisfy the "legal incidence"
analysis. Although the Government, by the express terms of its contract, would
pay the tax, the tax would be upon the property of the company. The difficulty
of assessment might be urged as a reason for supporting the majority view with
its deceptively simple approach, but it is believed that this would be no more
difficult than many other problems of valuation.17 It is submitted, moreover,
that the analysis of the majority is unsound in that it fails to recognize a fundamental distinction between two separate problems within the subject of federal
immunity from state taxation, and that this failure may lead only to further
confusion in law .18
.dllen C. Holmes

15 In a strong dissenting opinion it was correctly pointed out that, although the
doctrine of nondiscriminatory taxation has been applied to taxes on the property of
contractors dealing with the Government, it has never been held to justify a tax imposed
upon the Government's own property. Appeal of the Mesta Machine Co., 91 Pitts.
L. ]. 33 (1943).
16 City of Chicago v. Universty of Chicago, 302 Ill. 455, 134 N. E. 723, 23 A.L.R.
244 at 248 (1923). The absence of an express statute giving the state or local unit the
right to tax the leasehold interest only does not seem to have been considered a bar
to such taxation. San Pedro, L.A. and S.L.R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 179 P.
393 (1919). Cf. Doughtery v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192, 9 S. W. 99 (1888)
17 Cf. apportionment of special assessments for improvements between life tenant
and remainderman, 83 A.L.R. 793 (1933).
18 There have been no decisions by any federal court upon the precise issue raised
in the principal case; it would seem, however, that, in view of the numerous Government contracts involving just this arrangement, the point will soon be passed upon by
the federal courts.

